Passed in the waning days of the 109 th Congress before Democrats assumed control of both houses, the law is unique because it is the first piece of counterterrorism legislation that focuses exclusively on domestic terrorism, is largely aimed at American citizens, and because it brings the commission of non-violent property crimes and other low-level offenses under the banner of terrorist acts. Also, the law specifically targets the animal rights movement and, despite being characterized as a mere amendment, it drastically alters and leaves the original act virtually unrecognizable. Despite these major modifications, the AETA was treated in Congress as non-controversial legislation, allowing it virtually to sail through both the committee process and through the limited floor debate. A critical, comparative policy analysis of this seemingly innocuous, but far-reaching act is an important first step to opening up a dialogue regarding this
little known yet quite controversial law.
Background
The Commerce Clause authority, Congress proscribed actions that intentionally caused a "physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise by intentionally stealing, damaging, or causing the loss of any property (including animals or records) used by an animal enterprise, and Snyder 3 thereby causes economic damages exceeding $10,000 to that enterprise or conspir[ing] to do so"
and set a penitentiary term of one year plus payment of restitution for anyone convicted of an AETA-defined crime. The act also stipulated that if the defendant caused serious bodily injury or death to an individual, it would be treated as an "aggravated" offense.
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By adding the clause defining an "aggravated offense," Congress addressed changes in tactics of radical animal rights groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), and Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC). Those groups had tailored their campaigns to bypass the restrictions of the earlier AEPA. Rather than focus their efforts on an animal enterprise directly, activists began targeting employees of tertiary or peripheral enterprises that conduct business with the animal enterprise such as banks, suppliers, pharmaceutical companies, universities, and insurers. The groups used a wide range of tactics including vandalism, threats, harassments, property destruction, fraud and identity theft, and even bomb threats and deployments of improvised explosive devices (IED). 9 Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty. "1997-HLS expose in the USA," http://www.shac.net/HLS/exposed/michelle _rokke.html (accessed 8/27/08).
10 Norma Bennett Woolfe. "Huntington and backer Stephens sue activists: Anti-research campaign has farreaching consequences for laboratories, world-wide pharmaceutical industry." http://www.naiaonline.org/articles/archives/archives/Huntington.htm (accessed 7/15/08). information about employees, including home addresses, on the internet to encourage other activists to target them. Green also testified that employees of Chiron had been victims of numerous property crimes such as vandalism and property damage ranging from spray-painted messages such as "puppy killer" on a target's home to sprays of corrosive acids on their vehicles.
He went on to testify that two pipe bombs had been detonated at Chiron's California headquarters, shattering the glass entrance, and alleged that activists had begun to make similar bomb threats against individual employees. He implored the committee to pass legislation to help protect Chiron and other tertiary targets.
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In spite of its alleged weaknesses, the AEPA was successfully invoked to secure the convictions of six members of SHAC USA on March 3, 2006. The six co-defendants were convicted by a federal jury in New Jersey of conspiracy to violate the AEPA, along with several counts of interstate stalking and harassment. The jury found that, although none of the defendants themselves had been shown to have participated directly in crimes against HLS, the group's website had served to incite acts of violence against associates of HLS by posting their names and addresses on the website and by boasting about successful "direct actions," often using the word "we." Collectively, the six co-defendants were sentenced to over 23 years in prison.
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Although the convictions were a rebuke to the animal rights groups, representatives and lobbyists of biomedical technology firms, pharmaceutical enterprises and research universities still actively lobbied Congress to clamp down on radical animal and environmental activists. The broadened scope allows the AETA to cover crimes and "direct actions" against tertiary targets such as those identified in the congressional hearings. Protections for third parties such as banks and insurance companies are extended in the "intentionality clause" by explicitly stating that interference with such third parties in order to target a protected animal enterprise is a violation of the law.
The AETA removed the AEPA requirement that a "physical disruption" to the animal enterprise be demonstrated. That change allowed indirect interruptions, such as black faxing (sending multiple copies of a black page with the goal of exhausting the fax machine's supply of black ink), email jamming, and harassment such as home visits or threatening phone calls, to fall under the more ambiguous phrase "interfering with the operations." Further, the new law requires that the defendant be shown to have "intended" to damage or interfere with the animal enterprise but specified that intent could be established by a "course of conduct" defined simply as "a pattern of conduct composed of 2 or more acts, evidencing a continuality of purpose." That requirement, when combined with the interstate commerce requirement, is meant to safeguard against accidental violations that could result from legal protest activity.
The second component of the AETA's intent requirement stipulates that a violation intentionally places "a person (or a member of that person's family) in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury." That provision brings protections to individuals who are victims of phone calls or home visits where physical harm is either directly threatened, or insinuated. The provision explicitly includes crimes such as property damage, vandalism, harassment, and intimidation that are aimed at terrorizing the victim. The final provision of this section of the act makes it an equally punishable to conspire, or attempt to commit, animal enterprise terrorism.
Congress relied on its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce to bring these crimes under federal jurisdiction. Normally, property crimes such as vandalism and arson are state crimes (unless the target is a governmental entity) and fall under the purview of state courts. The rationale for grounding both the AEPA and the AETA on Congress's regulatory authority of the commerce clause is that, although the actual commission of these crimes is localized, the planning, funding, and preparation for these crimes usually involves either the transportation of people or funds or both across state lines. 26 Also, because many groups such as SHAC, ELF, and ALF lack a centralized governing body, the internet plays a huge role in coordinating the groups' activities by facilitating information used by activists in order to commit crimes.
By creating a federal law of animal enterprise terrorism and expanding the original act's scope, resources allocated to investigate and conduct surveillance on animal rights groups could 
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The AETA states that if a defendant has satisfied the interstate component of the act, the prosecution must also show that defendant intentionally damaged or interfered with the animal enterprise, or intentionally placed the victim in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury.
In both cases, the standard of proof rests with the idea of "course of conduct." While this "intentionality clause" appears to provide a safeguard against such accidental or unwitting violations of the act as unintended trespass during lawful demonstrations, the clause does not exempt all conceivable transgressions. The "intent" standard derives from the "course of Snyder 12
conduct" provision and requires merely that the prosecution demonstrate that two or more acts demonstrate a "continuality of purpose." The law, however, allows other ways to meet the "course of conduct" requirement and may rest on the more nebulous "intent" to commit an act of terrorism by "instilling a reasonable fear."
Provisions such as the vague idea of "reasonable fear" have generated the most controversy and criticism from civil liberties lawyers and advocates who argue that the unspecific "course of conduct" requirement contributes to a chilling effect on free speech. The chilling effect is a concern whenever laws are passed that deal directly with, or collides with, protected First Amendment free speech activities. 28 The argument is that any law that involves criminalizing protest or speech activities must be carefully crafted to avoid any chance that people, upon seeking to exercise their protected right to speech, may not be able to discern what
is, or what is not allowed under the law. Any ambiguity in the law may cause the person to err on the side of caution and choose not to exercise their right to free speech, thus creating a chilling effect.
When some lawmakers and civil liberties experts raised concerns about the chilling effect and the AETA, proponents countered that the section of the act titled Rules of Construction provide an adequate safeguard. Although the Rules of Construction do exempt many types of protest activities such as economic disruption from a lawful boycott, problems with the language remain and could contribute to a chilling effect. The Rules of Construction of the AETA states that the act shall not be construed:
( Under the AETA, property crimes such as vandalism, theft, arson, and trespass, even when steps are clearly taken to assure that no human life is endangered, become acts of terrorism, and the perpetrators become terrorists.
Definitions
The AETA provides for criminal penalties for intentionally instilling in the victim a "reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury." Many acts and crimes committed by members of radical animal rights or environmental groups could conceivably be found to instill a reasonable fear. What researcher would not fear bodily harm or even death after receiving ominous, threatening phone calls in the middle of the night, or fell victim to one of the home visits? People would be well within their logical bounds to fear for their lives after hearing that a pipe bomb had been detonated at their lab, or in a car of a colleague. Any such action is serious, criminal, and should be met with the full force of the law. Such crimes are designed to terrorize their victims, and as such it is easy to argue that they invoke terror in their targets. Similar crimes, however, such as those levied against abortion providers have not been prosecuted as acts of terrorism. The final provision of the act stipulates that conspiracies to commit, or attempt to commit, the crime of animal enterprise terrorism are equally punishable under the law. The conspiracy clause of the AETA is problematic in two key ways. First, by not distinguishing between an actual violation and a plan to violate, the act provides no incentives for an individual to opt out of a planned crime, especially if that person fears surveillance or the negative testimony of a co-conspirator. Of course, a criminal who is merely thwarted before he or she is able to execute a crime should not be rewarded, but in many areas of law the penalty for attempting a crime is substantially less than the penalty for committing it. For example, the States, are designed to allow parents of newborns the ability to drop their child off at a "safe location" such as a church or a hospital without the fear of prosecution for child abandonment.
While other states limit their Safe Haven laws to newborns ranging in age from three days to one year, Nebraska's legislators could not agree on where to draw the line, concerned that doing so could result in a needless death. In the end, they passed the law with no definition of what constituted a child. Enacted in July of 2008, it wasn't until September that the first child was dropped off at a Nebraska hospital. The "child" was an eleven-year old boy. In the next two months, thirty-five children, most of them between the ages of ten and seventeen, and several 
Penalties
The penalties section of the AETA is distinctly different from that of its predecessor. The AEPA established a six-month sentence for a person convicted of causing a "physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise," causing damages or causing "the loss of any property used by the animal enterprise" valued at less than $10,000 if no one was harmed. That sentence would, of course, be in addition to any sanctions from any accompanying property crime, or other subsequent convictions that may have been levied against the defendant. If the crime resulted in "major economic damage" to the enterprise ($10,000 or more) but had not caused serious bodily injury or death, the AEPA established a sentence of up to three years.
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If the crime resulted in "serious bodily injury or death" it was to be treated as an aggravated offense and the penalties (again, likely levied in addition to other state or federal charges) were much stiffer, calling for a term of up to 20 years for an offense that caused serious bodily injury to another individual. No provision in the AEPA provided for charges for merely "instilling a reasonable fear of serious bodily harm or death." The AEPA also provided for possible restitution for the animal enterprise to recover damages "for the reasonable cost of repeating any experimentation that was interrupted or invalidated as a result of the offense; and the loss of food production or farm income reasonably attributable to the offense."
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The AETA, however, departs from that format entirely and metes out graduated or tiered penalties derived either from the amount of economic damages done to the animal enterprise or victim, or by being shown to have "instilled a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury"
to the enterprise or the individuals who work there.
The penalties section of the AETA appears as follows:
(b) Penalties-The punishment for a violation of section (a) or an attempt or conspiracy to violate subsection (a) shall be-(1) a fine under this title or imprisonment not more than 1 year, or both, if the offense does not instill in another the reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or death and-(A) the offense results in no economic damage or bodily injury; or (B) the offense results in economic damage that does not exceed $10,000 (2) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, if no bodily injury occurs and-(A) the offense results in economic damage exceeding $10,000 but not exceeding $100,000; or (B) the offense instills in another the reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or death; (3) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, if-(A) the offense results in economic damage exceeding $100,000] (B) the offense results in substantial bodily injury to another individual; (4) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both, if-(A) the offense results in serious bodily injury to another individual; or (B) the offense results in economic damage exceeding $1,000,000; and (5) imprisonment for life or for any terms of years, a fine under this title, or both, if the offense results in death of another individual. 36
The AETA completely alters the penalties originally established in the AEPA. The lowest level offense provides for a one-year sentence, or fine, or both, for damages that do not exceed $10,000, or for violations that render no economic damage at all. Whereas the AEPA had a maximum sentence of three-year cap for "victimless" crimes that did exceed $10,000, the tiered structure under the AETA calls for a sentence of up to five years if the crime causes economic damages of between $10,000 and $100,000 but no serious bodily injury. If the crime causes more than $100,000 in damages or results in substantial bodily injury (defined as "deep cuts or 35 AEPA, 1992.
36 AETA, 2006. abrasions," "broken bones," significant physical pain," or "illness") the defendant may be sentenced to up to 10 years. Finally the act provides for a sentence of up to twenty years if the damages exceed $1,000,000 or if the crime results in serious bodily injury to another individual.
Concurrently, the act also calls for a sentence of up to five years if the offense "instills in another a reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or death." This provision is not tied to any necessity to demonstrate economic damages, but remains tied to the intentional commission of one of the act's provisions against trespass, harassment, or intimidation. Finally, the act provides for life imprisonment if the offense results in another individual's death.
The term "economic damages" is defined in the definitions section of the AETA as:
means the replacement costs of lost or damaged property or records, the costs of repeating an interrupted or invalidated experiment, the loss of profits, or increased costs, including losses and increased costs resulting from threats, acts or vandalism, property damage, trespass, harassment, or intimidation taken against a person or entity on account of that person's or entity's connection to, relationship with, or transactions with the animal enterprise; but (B) does not include any lawful economic disruption (including a lawful boycott) that results from lawful public, governmental, or business reaction to the disclosure of information about an animal enterprise [emphasis added].

37
The language above suggests that a wide range of possible damages may be included Snyder 20
While not considered protected speech, low-level crimes such as trespass have been committed throughout history to advance causes such as the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. In that case, protestors knew that their actions were illegal, that they would be subject to arrest, and that they would be issued relatively predictable criminal sanctions.
Therefore, they were able to conduct a personal "cost-benefit analysis" about whether to take part in extra-legal forms of protest. Having charges tied to economic damages clouds the question of whether to participate in protest and lends support to critics' assertions that the AETA could chill speech by discouraging dissent.
As the conspiracy to commit or attempt to commit the crime of animal enterprise terrorism is equally punishable under the AETA, a clear system is necessary to determine the economic damages resulting from what, in some cases, will have remained a hypothetical crime.
In fact, it is possible that defendants charged under the conspiracy clause of the AETA could find themselves facing a more serious sentence merely by being caught before the commission of the crime. Before the act is committed, its success is impossible to know; nor can anyone know whether the act will cause the desired amount of damage to the enterprise. An arson meant to destroy a building may merely cause superficial damages and, as such, the amount of economic damages included to calculate the defendant's sentence could have the ironic outcome of resulting in lesser charges. If, however, investigators thwarted a defendant in the planning stages of the same arson, that defendant could potentially face a far harsher criminal penalty, assuming that the prosecution includes the hypothetical economic damages that may have resulted if the planned arson was successful. Such inconsistencies call attention to the inherent problem of providing no distinction between planned and executed crimes in the AETA. Altering the penalties section in a way that eliminates the double hypothetical could mitigate the problem. premises, starting a fire or defacing or damaging the premises, and theft by unlawful taking, theft by deception, forgery, or identity theft.
The list of crimes covers many of the tangible and intangible offenses committed by radical animal and ecological activists highlighted in the congressional hearings and provides victims with protection from most of the more egregious crimes. Like the AETA, the Pennsylvania law does not create any new crimes; it merely allows for enhanced criminal penalties based on the motivation or target of the crime, but the act clearly delineates the enhanced penalties. A defendant convicted of having committed the crime of ecoterrorism, faces an increase of 1 degree on the subsequent property crime charge. For example, if the specified property crime was a third degree misdemeanor, it will be increased to the second degree.
Likewise, a first-degree misdemeanor will be increased to a Class C felony. If the specified offense against property is already a first-degree felony, such as arson, the defendant's possible sentence could be enhanced to a term of up to 40 years. The penalties in the Pennsylvania law are severe enough to dissuade activists from committing these crimes but are not based on methodologies that are open to conjecture as in the AETA.
By clearly stipulating both the crime and the expected punishment, and by tying more obfuscated crimes like harassment or intimidation to the commission of a property crime such as trespass conducted "in order to threaten or terrorize the owner or occupant of the premises," the Pennsylvania law seems to avoid the more problematic elements of the AETA. Pennsylvania allows for victims of animal and ecologically motivated crimes to seek appropriate reprieve from the government, while avoiding a lack of clarity in either the crime or the punishment.
The Pennsylvania law does not contain a conspiracy clause as does the AETA, but other state laws cover attempts and "conspiracies to commit" some of the crimes listed in the Snyder 23 ecoterrorism law. Like the AETA, the Pennsylvania law does allow the recovery of damages to the enterprise or individual, but the restitution damages are limited to tangible losses and must be demonstrated to be a result of the specified crime against property used to secure conviction. A separate section also allows for civil action and relief by "an individual aggrieved by the offense of ecoterrorism." Finally, the Pennsylvania law also contains a section similar to AETA's Rules of Construction which immunizes protected free speech activities from prosecution under both the federal and the state's Constitution, albeit with many of the same limitations present in the AETA.
Civil liberties groups raised objections and concerns about the Pennsylvania law just as they did about the AETA. In testimony presented to the Pennsylvania Senate Judiciary Committee, Larry Frankel, Legislative Director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, expressed concerns about the constitutionality of the law because of its specialized focus on animal and environmental activists, asserting that the law unfairly engages in "viewpoint discrimination." Critics of AETA had expressed similar objections, asserting that the laws unfairly target animal and environmental protestors in order to stifle dissent. Critics argue that, despite containing provisions protecting and exempting legal, legitimate protest activities, both AETA and the Pennsylvania law present First Amendment issues because they seem to target issue-specific political speech. Like AETA, FACE protects against unwitting violations by requiring that intent be demonstrated and provides protection to abortion providers who are the targets of aggressive, sometimes violent anti-abortion campaigns. The first and perhaps most notable distinction between the two laws is that a violation of FACE is not defined as an act of terrorism. Another difference is encapsulated in the prohibited activities section of FACE where equal protection is provided both to clinics and their opponents, thus extending protections to "any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious worship." The AETA affords no such inverse protections to either animal rights activists, or to the animals they seek to protect.
Freedom of Access to Clinic
Further, language in FACE directs the courts to treat a "nonviolent physical obstruction" less harshly than other, more serious violations. Clearly the authors of FACE felt it prudent to distinguish between violent and nonviolent actions with harsher penalties reserved for violent actions. Why provide such exemptions, when they conflict so sharply with the purpose of the law? Perhaps the authors hoped to mitigate a potential chilling effect by allowing protestors to understand that a peaceful violation of the law would not result in harsh sanctions until the defendant could be shown to be a habitual offender. especially if their clients face charges from the more vague or expansive provisions of the act. Still, several modifications or amendments to the law could mitigate some of these hypothetical issues and preempt later problems in court.
Conclusion
In spite of the AETA, incidents of animal rights extremism still make headlines.
Recently, researchers involved with animal research at the University of California, Santa Cruz, were the targets of pipe bomb attacks, 41 and four releases of mink from mink farms have occurred in the Western U.S. in the past year. 42 Because the AETA passed virtually uncontested, and because it addresses a legitimate and high profile legal issue, little support may exist for the outright repeal of the law. Several possible modifications, however, could improve the law.
The AETA should be revisited to improve the clarity of its definitions and scope.
Congressional hearings clearly demonstrated the need to extend the AEPA to include tertiary targets because its original scope was too narrow to provide protection to many of the enterprise and individuals who had been victims of animal rights extremism. Although legitimate activist groups must have their rights to protest zealously safeguarded, the government must equally safeguard the rights of its citizens to live and work free from fear and intimidation, and keep their property safe from destruction.
Other amendments the AETA made to the AEPA are less easily justified. It is hard to imagine an activist charged with making harassing (but non-threatening) phone calls, civil disobedience, or low level property crimes like graffiti being charged under AETA, regardless of whether they satisfy the requirements that their actions be interstate in nature and intentioned through the establishment of a "course of conduct." It is far more likely that possible charges under the AETA could be used as leverage against them in order to pressure them into cooperating with law enforcement, coerce them into becoming "informants,"
or pleading guilty to stiffer state charges than they might have faced without the threat of AETA charges.
Also, the AETA makes it a crime to "intentionally damage or interfere with the operation of an animal enterprise." Of course, the goal of many animal rights activists is to interfere with business operations and bring about reforms. Business reforms tend to be enacted only when it becomes more fiscally or operationally prudent to do so. Although the act is purportedly written to require that the interference be caused in conjunction with "criminal acts," the language of the bill actually provides for a wide net of possible infractions, many of which may be better described as nuisances than acts of terrorism.
The crafters of the bill clearly wanted to create a mechanism to distinguish crimes against In fact, a federal remedy already exists that is available to judges and accomplishes just such a distinction. The terrorist enhancement measure is a sentencing mechanism, used at the discretion of a judge, to heighten the criminal penalties of defendants found to have committed politically or ideologically motivated crimes and to distinguish these crimes as terrorist acts.
Indeed, the enhancement measure was recently utilized against members of the Earth Liberation Front who were prosecuted for a series of environmentally motivated arsons in the Northwest.
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The Pennsylvania law may also provide a good model for changes that could be made to the way penalties are determined under the AETA. Rather than having the tiered or graduated penalties based largely on economic damages, the AETA could provide for an enhancement mechanism similar to the one used in the Pennsylvania law. That change would eliminate some of the most contentious elements of the AETA by providing clear criminal punishments not subject to economic damages that may be arbitrarily tabulated.
Given the broad bipartisan support for the AETA, substantial revision of the law is doubtful. Therefore, a more likely approach could be to revisit the definitions section of the act Also, the law needs a definition for what constitutes an attempt or a conspiracy to violate the AETA. Again, the lack of a standard of proof to establish an attempt or a conspiracy is especially problematic with the AETA because of the double hypothetical it creates. Perhaps a specific "course of conduct" could be established that defines or demonstrates a conspiracy and an attempt to conspire. Given that the First Amendment provides activists with freedom of speech and freedom of association, the current way the conspiracy clause is presented in the AETA is far too ambiguous to allow the average citizen to decipher where the line is drawn between supporting a more radical protest group, and actually conspiring with them.
Finally, the Rules of Construction should be rewritten to exempt certain extra-legal activities, provided those activities are conducted with the purpose of either facilitating a Snyder 30 peaceful civil disobedience on private property or for documenting and revealing violations of animal welfare laws. These actions could still be subject to applicable state criminal charges such as trespass, or to civil suit actions such as Huntingdon's civil suit against PETA, but they should not be classified as violations of the AETA and therefore acts of terrorism. These changes represent relatively minor adjustments to the AETA but would go a long way toward addressing some of its more problematic elements. The result might provide for a better law, one that accomplishes its purpose while mitigating negative peripheral effects. Finally, a national dialogue needs to focus on the traditional legal definition of domestic terrorism and whether legislation should be focused exclusively on one particular social movement such as it is with the AETA. Measuring whether the AETA is adversely affecting mainstream animal rights groups, or chilling speech, is difficult because no empirical data currently exists that would measure whether people are "opting out" of protesting and activism because of fears of being branded a terrorist. Further, the extra-legal techniques described in this paper are not exclusively deployed by the animal rights movement but rather are emblematic of several fringe protest groups championing causes on both the right and left of the political spectrum. The ability to dissent is the cornerstone of any functioning democratic society and that right should be protected zealously even when it is politically difficult to do so. However, many of the techniques described by witnesses and targets of animal rights extremism are deplorable and have no place in a freely functioning society. The grievances expressed are real and victims must be able to find appropriate reprieve from the legal system. As it exists today the AETA is too problematic to serve that function.
